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commit b4db45b upstream. The rk3588s-roc-pc ES8388 codec is connected to the i2s0_8ch audio interface. Use the matching I2S0 MCLK output for the codec clock instead of I2S1. Using the I2S1 MCLK can leave the ALSA PCM running while the codec has no usable master clock for the active audio path, resulting in silent headphone output. Also make the CPU DAI provide bitclock and frame clock. This matches the active Rockchip I2S controller side and avoids relying on the codec to drive the bus clocks. Route the headphone output to LOUT2 and ROUT2, matching the old 5.10 BSP device tree. LOUT1 and ROUT1 are used for the speaker route there, so using them for the headphone widget can leave the headphone jack silent even while the ALSA path is active. The old BSP also used hp-con-gpio on GPIO1_A4. Model that GPIO as a simple audio amplifier so DAPM enables the headphone connection when the headphone path is active. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7f95097 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add DTs for Firefly ROC-RK3588S-PC") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@nabladev.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703025648.180135-1-festevam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e4cb63 upstream. Commit 4785aa8 ("cpuidle, ACPI: Evaluate LPI arch_flags for broadcast timer") replaced the generic nonzero check for LPI architectural context loss flags with arch_get_idle_state_flags(). RISC-V does not implement the helper, so it falls back to the stub that returns 0. Consequently, CPUIDLE_FLAG_TIMER_STOP is not set when an LPI state loses the hart timer context, preventing cpuidle from using a broadcast timer for that state. Implement the RISC-V helper and map the hart timer context loss flag to CPUIDLE_FLAG_TIMER_STOP. Fixes: 4785aa8 ("cpuidle, ACPI: Evaluate LPI arch_flags for broadcast timer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Yixun Lan <dlan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sunil V L <sunilvl@oss.qualcomm.com> Reviewed-by: Huisong Li <lihuisong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Peixin Xie <peixin.xie@linux.spacemit.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260803-riscv-acpi-lpi-timer-v3-1-520fa13732f5@linux.spacemit.com Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 34c9cfc upstream. A kthread is used to run check_vector_unaligned_access() to optimize boot time, allowing the kernel to continue booting without waiting for the unaligned vector speed probe to finish. However, this asynchronous approach introduces several complications. First, the kthread may not complete before a user reads vDSO data, resulting in incorrect values. This was previously addressed by commit 5d15d2a ("riscv: hwprobe: Fix stale vDSO data for late-initialized keys at boot"), which added complex synchronization between the kthread and vDSO reads. Second, it was discovered that the kthread may not finish before vec_check_unaligned_access_speed_all_cpus() (marked with __init) is freed, triggering a page fault. These issues raise the question of whether the kthread is worth the added complexity. A past boot time regression report was actually unrelated to synchronous probing; it was caused by the probe running serially. Since switching to a parallel probe, no further complaints have been made. Furthermore, the unaligned scalar access speed probe takes the same amount of time, runs synchronously, and has caused no issues. Testing shows no noticeable boot time slowdown when running the vector probe synchronously (0.464474s with kthread vs. 0.457991s without). Remove the kthread usage and run the probe synchronously. This simplifies the boot flow and allows for the revert of commit 5d15d2a ("riscv: hwprobe: Fix stale vDSO data for late-initialized keys at boot") Reported-by: Anirudh Srinivasan <asrinivasan@oss.tenstorrent.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20260612-vec_unaligned_drop_init-v1-1-df969210ae34@oss.tenstorrent.com/ Fixes: e7c9d66 ("RISC-V: Report vector unaligned access speed hwprobe") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Jesse Taube <jtaubepe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Anirudh Srinivasan <asrinivasan@oss.tenstorrent.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1c378963f27c5960e8a57c50b8b444d30954cb54.1781666867.git.namcao@linutronix.de [pjw@kernel.org: updated to apply; adjusted Fixes: tag; fixed my own manual patch application error] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 22f9efb upstream. Make sure to drop the reference taken to the SCP device when attempting to look up its driver data before the driver has been bound. Note that holding a reference to a device does not prevent its driver data from going away. Fixes: 63c13d6 ("remoteproc/mediatek: add SCP support for mt8183") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.6 Cc: Erin Lo <erin.lo@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260706065614.389412-1-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a5edadb upstream. vmclock_miscdev_mmap() rejects writable mappings of the shared vmclock ABI page with -EROFS, but leaves VM_MAYWRITE set. Userspace can map the page read-only and then upgrade it to writable with mprotect(), after which the guest can corrupt the host-written timekeeping data (sequence counter, UTC time, TSC offset) that the vmclock ABI defines as read-only. Clear VM_MAYWRITE on the read-only path so the mapping cannot be upgraded, as i915 does for its read-only objects and as fixed in drm/vc4 (CVE-2026-68445) and drm/panthor (CVE-2024-53071). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2050327 ("ptp: Add support for the AMZNC10C 'vmclock' device") Signed-off-by: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260813174707.14809-1-suruurism@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 06aa3d2 upstream. Under memory pressure, the qede driver encounters NULL pointer dereferences when processing TPA continuation fragments. Commit 8a86339 ("qede: Add build_skb() support.") accidentally dropped the assignment of tpa_info->buffer.data in qede_tpa_start(). When memory pressure causes an SKB allocation failure in qede_tpa_start(), the driver sets tpa_start_fail = true and attempts to recycle the physical page later in qede_tpa_end() via qede_reuse_page(). However, because buffer.data was left uninitialized (NULL), qede_reuse_page() pushes a "ghost" BD (valid DMA mapping but NULL data pointer) back into the active Rx ring. The next time the hardware uses this ring slot, it passes a NULL page to qede_fill_frag_skb(), causing a kernel panic. Example crash from production system: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x8 RIP: qede_fill_frag_skb+0x96/0x430 [qede] Call Trace: qede_rx_int+0xb06/0x1de0 qede_poll+0x2f4/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0x2d/0x130 Fix the root cause by restoring the tpa_info->buffer.data assignment in qede_tpa_start(), ensuring valid pages are correctly tracked and recycled. Additionally, update the stale comment for struct qede_agg_info::buffer to reflect its current usage. Fixes: 8a86339 ("qede: Add build_skb() support.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Nagare <vnagare@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260818073309.2266072-1-vnagare@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a710060 upstream. c4iw_uld_state_change() queues reg_work to register the RDMA device. c4iw_remove() can free ctx->dev while this work is pending or running, leaving c4iw_register_device() accessing the freed device. Cancel reg_work before removing the device. The registration work can tear down ctx->dev when registration fails, so do not unregister or deallocate it again in that case. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. Fixes: 1c8f1da ("iw_cxgb4: Fix possible circular dependency locking warning") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260806130128.465460-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1d0f877 upstream. ionic_fill_lif_cfg() reads eq_count from firmware uncapped, but the eth driver only reserves ionic->neqs_per_lif MSI-X vectors for RDMA event queues. Since ionic_rdma probes via the auxiliary bus before the netdev is brought up, it can exhaust the shared interrupt bitmap, causing ionic_open() to fail with -ENOSPC when allocating rx/tx interrupts. Cap RDMA eq_count to neqs_per_lif, which is populated by ionic_lif_size() at PCI probe before the RDMA aux device registers. Fixes: 8d765af ("RDMA/ionic: Register auxiliary module for ionic ethernet adapter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Abhijit Gangurde <abhijit.gangurde@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805053254.4023262-1-abhijit.gangurde@amd.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ecbe7d3 upstream. ucma_set_ib_path() calls ucma_event_handler() straight from the write() path, without the handler lock that keeps ctx->file stable while a uevent is queued. The handler re-reads ctx->file for every dereference: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ A concurrent ucma_migrate_id() reassigns ctx->file while the SET_OPTION caller sleeps in mutex_lock(), so the list_add_tail() lands on file B's event_list while only file A's mutex is held, racing every other user of that list: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888153c6a418 by task poc_corr/486 Call Trace: __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0 ucma_event_handler+0x1be/0xc00 ucma_set_ib_path+0x45e/0x710 ucma_set_option+0x32e/0x590 ucma_write+0x1f9/0x330 Allocated by task 505: ucma_write_cm_event+0x1a1/0x660 Freed by task 505: kfree+0x1da/0x4c0 ucma_get_event+0x5d5/0x7e0 The freed object is a ucma_event that another thread dequeued from file B's list under file B's mutex. File A's mut is left held on top of that, wedging its next writer in uninterruptible sleep. This path needs a bound and address-resolved cm_id, so it requires an RDMA device to be present. Take the handler lock around the call. Fixes: 09e328e ("RDMA/ucma: Fix the locking of ctx->file") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/2823D190-92D5-4714-8769-4FB643C64FF3@doyensec.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f4cc21c upstream. ctx->file may only be changed under the handler lock and the xa_lock, which is what stops uevents being queued for a ctx while ucma_migrate_id() moves it to another file. The CM core takes that lock before invoking ucma_event_handler(), but the write() paths that queue uevents themselves do not. ucma_write_cm_event() re-reads ctx->file for each of its four dereferences, so ucma_migrate_id() can swap it mid-sequence: mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */ list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */ mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */ wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */ The window is the mutex_lock() itself: the writer sleeps in it while the migration reassigns ctx->file. The list_add_tail() then runs on file B's event_list holding only file A's mutex: list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff888101320f30), but was ffff88814a08c418. (prev=ffff88814a075c18). kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:32! Call Trace: ucma_write_cm_event+0x36e/0x5e0 and file A's mut is left held forever, wedging its next writer in D state. The uevent is also stranded on a list ucma_cleanup_ctx_events() will not walk, so it outlives its context. /dev/infiniband/rdma_cm is 0666 and no RDMA device is involved, so an unprivileged user reaches all of this. Take the handler lock, as ucma_cleanup_mc_events() does; ctx->cm_id is pinned by the ucma_get_ctx() reference. Fixes: a3c9d0f ("RDMA/ucma: Support write an event into a CM") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/60544A67-EFD6-4D5D-974C-D983445F1070@doyensec.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 011199f upstream. The original commit missed that three drivers (mthca, irdma, siw) have UHW data associated with reg_mr that cannot be passed through the ioctl. They also assume that the udata cannot be NULL, so failing to pass a valid udata can trigger a NULL udata crash in those drivers. This never happens in real systems since in rdma-core ibv_cmd_reg_mr_ex() does not accept a udata and those three drivers don't use it, however a malicious userspace could trigger it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5b2e450 ("IB/core: Add UVERBS_METHOD_REG_MR on the MR object") Reported-by: Jacob Moroni <jmoroni@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHYDg1TOGxRGZrS69d4Y--Shj_DZv0nJuM73iHUBwBM70g_t3Q@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…aving dangling of_node pointer commit f9324d6 upstream. In as3722_get_regulator_dt_data(), of_get_child_by_name() acquires a reference on np, which is then assigned to pdev->dev.of_node. The function immediately calls of_node_put(np), releasing the reference and leaving pdev->dev.of_node as a dangling pointer. Remove the of_node_put(np) call to let the device hold the reference. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bc40733 ("regulator: as3722: add regulator driver for AMS AS3722") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626160150.54291-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…wnership transferred to rdata commit 7c8cc25 upstream. In max8998_pmic_dt_parse_pdata(), of_get_child_by_name() acquires a reference on reg_np which is then stored in rdata->reg_node, transferring ownership to the regulator data array. The subsequent of_node_put(reg_np) at the end of the function releases the last matched regulator node's reference, leaving rdata->reg_node as a dangling pointer for the last entry. Remove the spurious of_node_put(reg_np) call. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 156f252 ("drivers: regulator: add Maxim 8998 driver") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626160326.54457-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 05dfeb2 upstream. As per the REFGEN IP team, this block supplies the reference current to the PHYs in the SoC. So, correct the regulator type to REGULATOR_CURRENT to match with the HW behavior. Fixes: 7cbfbe2 ("regulator: Introduce Qualcomm REFGEN regulator driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Kathiravan Thirumoorthy <kathiravan.thirumoorthy@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617-ipq9650_refgen-v4-1-c505ea6c6661@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e743527 upstream. ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() is racy with ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set, it can allocate a reader page with an outdated order. This isn't a big issue, the user can still re-allocate a new reader page and try again. However, what is more problematic is if the value of subbuf_order changes in the middle of ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(). In that case, bpage->order might not match the actual allocated memory. Use bpage->order for the allocation to prevent this race. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260813131152.3589632-6-vdonnefort@google.com Fixes: bce761d ("ring-buffer: Read and write to ring buffers with custom sub buffer size") Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 234b1a7 upstream. When sub-buffers use an order greater than 0, cpu_buffer->free_page is allocated with subbuf_order. Use the correct order for cpu_buffer->free_page. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260813131152.3589632-2-vdonnefort@google.com Fixes: f9b94da ("ring-buffer: Set new size of the ring buffer sub page") Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260806211306.3704194-1-vdonnefort%40google.com # patch 3 Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24974bd upstream. Because, ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set() can clear cpu_buffer->free_page, hold cpu_buffer->lock to prevent races with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() and ring_buffer_free_read_page(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260813131152.3589632-3-vdonnefort@google.com Fixes: 8e7b58c ("ring-buffer: Just update the subbuffers when changing their allocation order") Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260810125633.3344684-1-vdonnefort%40google.com # patch 3 Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cb258d6 upstream. device_prepare() blocks runtime PM for a device with runtime PM disabled before invoking its system-sleep ->prepare() callback. For a device that has never enabled runtime PM, this changes dev->power.last_status from RPM_INVALID to RPM_BLOCKED. If the callback returns an error, dpm_prepare() does not move the device to dpm_prepared_list. Consequently, the recovery path through dpm_complete() never calls device_complete() for the failing device. The error path drops the runtime PM usage reference, but does not clear RPM_BLOCKED. A later legitimate pm_runtime_enable() then reports: Attempt to enable runtime PM when it is blocked before clearing the stale state. Call pm_runtime_unblock() on the prepare error path before dropping the runtime PM reference, matching the cleanup performed by device_complete(). The issue was reproduced with a platform test device whose ->prepare() callback returns -EIO while runtime PM has never been enabled. Before the fix, last_status remained RPM_BLOCKED after the failed suspend and the first pm_runtime_enable() produced the warning above. With the fix, last_status is restored to RPM_INVALID and the warning is absent. Fixes: 3e5eee1 ("PM: Block enabling of runtime PM during system suspend") Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shibo Zhu <3499129952@qq.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_C5AC0A02FC01F700E764F8C2E3ECE4F41009@qq.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f574296 upstream. On a readdir downcall, orangefs_devreq_write_iter() frees op->downcall.trailer_buf with vfree() when copy_from_iter_full() fails, but does not clear the pointer before goto Efault. The waiter in do_readdir() is then woken with a negative status and frees the same pointer again on its r < 0 path, causing a deterministic double-free. A client holding /dev/pvfs2-req triggers it by sending a readdir downcall whose declared trailer_size exceeds the bytes it supplies. Clear the pointer after freeing so the readdir-side vfree() becomes a no-op. Fixes: 382f458 ("orangefs: rewrite readdir to fix several bugs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Yifei Gao <gyf161023@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d410cd5 upstream. orangefs_prepare_cdm_array() sizes each client debug keyword buffer with strcspn(cds_head, " "), but then parses the keyword with %s. The %s conversion skips leading whitespace, while strcspn() does not. If a client debug entry starts with a space, the allocation can be sized for an empty keyword while sscanf() copies the following non-empty token. This can write past the end of the allocated keyword buffer. Skip leading spaces before computing the keyword length so the allocation matches the string parsed by sscanf(). Fixes: f7be4ee ("Orangefs: kernel client part 4") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <zhilinz@nebusec.ai> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 82ea9d4 upstream. Local fuzzing of 6.12.94 has found the following memory leak caused by doing 'copy_file_range()' within the same filesystem: unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c980 (size 32): comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ c0 c5 92 21 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 06 00 00 ...!............ backtrace (crc 7068d63f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline] ocfs2_find_per_slot_free_list fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6618 [inline] ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x155/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6786 ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline] ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613 ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline] __ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985 ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237 ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825 ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138 ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098 ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline] ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline] ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349 ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline] ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470 ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline] ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451 iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:944 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x232/0x480 fs/splice.c:1167 splice_direct_to_actor+0x4b4/0xb60 fs/splice.c:1111 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1210 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x10f/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1236 do_sendfile+0x430/0xbf0 fs/read_write.c:1388 unreferenced object 0xffff88812192c5c0 (size 32): comm "syz.0.49", pid 12095, jiffies 4294964143 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 29 70 00 00 00 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 )p.............. backtrace (crc afec850f): kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4152 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4197 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x168/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4358 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:878 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1014 [inline] ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc+0x25c/0x4b0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6793 ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:6819 [inline] ocfs2_unlink_path+0x286/0x450 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2613 ocfs2_rotate_subtree_left fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2779 [inline] __ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x1f6f/0x2da0 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:2985 ocfs2_rotate_tree_left+0x283/0xe00 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3237 ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent+0xf56/0x1a20 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:3825 ocfs2_split_extent+0x15f4/0x2940 fs/ocfs2/alloc.c:5138 ocfs2_clear_ext_refcount+0x2f6/0x550 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3098 ocfs2_replace_clusters fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3131 [inline] ocfs2_make_clusters_writable fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3255 [inline] ocfs2_replace_cow+0x991/0x1660 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3349 ocfs2_refcount_cow_hunk fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3427 [inline] ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x5e1/0x9f0 fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c:3470 ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write fs/ocfs2/file.c:2340 [inline] ocfs2_file_write_iter+0xbda/0x1880 fs/ocfs2/file.c:2451 iter_file_splice_write+0x890/0xf60 fs/splice.c:743 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:944 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x232/0x480 fs/splice.c:1167 splice_direct_to_actor+0x4b4/0xb60 fs/splice.c:1111 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1210 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x10f/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1236 do_sendfile+0x430/0xbf0 fs/read_write.c:1388 This happens when 'ocfs2_cache_block_dealloc()' called from 'ocfs2_cache_extent_block_free()' uses the suballocator to schedule extent removal, so 'ocfs2_run_deallocs()' should be run unconditionally to complete the removal with 'ocfs2_free_cached_blocks()'. An extra semi-automated static analysis [1] suspects that the same scenario looks possible in 'ocfs2_attach_refcount_tree()' and 'ocfs2_reflink_remap_blocks()' as well, but, since 'ocfs2_run_deallocs()' is a safe no-op for an empty dealloc context, 'ocfs2_create_reflink_node()' and 'ocfs2_reflink_xattrs()' may be adjusted in the same way too, thus keeping the code pattern consistent. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260721102840.387663-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/f1d7e266-4b44-41b9-98c0-5b3868a8d9c3@yandex.ru [1] Fixes: 6f70fa5 ("ocfs2: Add CoW support.") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru> Suggested-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea5b560 upstream. Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm". The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any other node with a malformed message. Three defects: - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215 attacker-controlled bytes. - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes. - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the message is large enough to hold that many entries, so dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len) copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic). The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is unaffected. o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a member of the cluster. Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request. I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement. This patch (of 2): A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[] array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain. Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-0-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-1-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Fixes: 6714d8e ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b54e03d upstream. A node receiving a DLM_MIG_LOCKRES message trusts several fields of the peer-supplied dlm_migratable_lockres without validation. num_locks and lockname_len are bounded only on the sending side, and the message is never checked to actually carry num_locks migratable_lock entries. As a result dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[0..num_locks) past the kmalloc(data_len) copy of the message (an out-of-bounds read that ends in a BUG_ON panic), and dlm_init_lockres() copies lockname_len bytes into the fixed 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object (a heap out-of-bounds write). Both are reachable by any node in the domain. Validate these fields right after dlm_grab(), before anything uses them -- including the not-joined error path, which already prints mres->lockname with the unbounded lockname_len as a %.*s precision. Reject the message unless lockname_len <= DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX, num_locks <= DLM_MAX_MIGRATABLE_LOCKS (the bound the sender already asserts), and the payload is large enough to hold the claimed locks. Conforming recovery and migration messages are unaffected. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-2-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Fixes: 6714d8e ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ca62df upstream. ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array with: for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) { rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i]; ... rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the 16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW operation walks the array. A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i] for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does: if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used)) memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1], &rf_list->rl_recs[index], (le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) * sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec)); i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink (FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem. ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC, signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]: if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) { rc = ocfs2_error(...); goto bail; } Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block(): reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used > rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set, because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list (rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing "!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or rf_list is the live member of the union. With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove() in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(). Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build: replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in __ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch, and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the forged rl_used/rl_count. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260709132609.44233-1-security@auditcode.ai Fixes: f2c870e ("ocfs2: Add ocfs2_read_refcount_block.") Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…on_pin() commit af09df8 upstream. Patch series "ocfs2: cluster: o2hb_region_pin() fixes", v2. This series fixes three related issues in o2hb_region_pin(), all are from the original implementation in commit: 58a3158 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions"): 1) It is called with o2hb_live_lock (a spinlock) held, but the underlying configfs_depend_item() sleeps (takes inode rwsem and pins the filesystem). This triggers BUG under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP. 2) When called from the configfs drop_item callback, it creates a lock order inversion: parent inode_lock -> configfs root inode_lock, which can deadlock against subsystem unregistration paths taking root -> parent. 3) If pinning fails partway through o2hb_region_inc_user(), the o2hb_dependent_users counter is leaked and partially-pinned regions are never released, leaving heartbeat regions unprotected on subsequent mounts. Patch 1 reworks o2hb_region_pin() to drop o2hb_live_lock across each sleeping configfs_depend_item() call, using a config_item reference to keep the region alive while unlocked. Patch 2 adds a from_callback parameter to select configfs_depend_item_unlocked() when called from configfs context, avoiding the inode_lock nesting. Patch 3 fixes the error path in o2hb_region_inc_user() to unpin and decrement the counter on failure. This patch (of 3): o2hb_region_pin() is always called with the o2hb_live_lock spinlock held (from o2hb_region_inc_user() and o2hb_heartbeat_group_drop_item()), but it calls o2nm_depend_item() -> configfs_depend_item(), which sleeps: it pins the configfs filesystem and takes the configfs root inode rwsem. Under CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP this triggers: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c in_atomic(): 1, ... name: mount.ocfs2 down_write configfs_depend_item o2hb_region_pin o2hb_region_inc_user o2hb_register_callback dlm_register_domain_handlers ... ocfs2_dlm_init ocfs2_mount_volume ocfs2_fill_super Rework o2hb_region_pin() to pin one region at a time with the lock dropped across the sleeping call: under o2hb_live_lock find the next eligible region and take a config_item reference to keep it alive, drop the lock, call o2nm_depend_item(), then retake the lock and record the pin. The config_item_put() is done with the lock released as well, since o2hb_region_release() also acquires o2hb_live_lock and can sleep. The region list may change while unlocked, so the scan restarts from the top after each pin. Local heartbeat still pins only the matching region; global heartbeat pins all eligible regions. The unpin path is unaffected: configfs_undepend_item() only takes a spinlock and does not sleep. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-2-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 58a3158 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…drop_item commit cd78999 upstream. o2hb_heartbeat_group_drop_item() is called from configfs rmdir with the parent directory's inode_lock held. It calls o2hb_region_pin() -> o2nm_depend_item() -> configfs_depend_item(), which acquires the configfs root inode_lock. This creates a parent -> root inode_lock nesting that could deadlock against paths taking root -> parent (e.g. subsystem unregistration). Fix this by using configfs_depend_item_unlocked() when o2hb_region_pin() is called from a configfs callback context. This variant skips the root inode_lock when caller and target are in the same subsystem, which is safe because VFS already holds a lock preventing unregistration. Add o2nm_depend_item_unlocked() wrapper and a from_callback parameter to o2hb_region_pin() to select the appropriate variant. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-3-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 58a3158 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 12c2ab4 upstream. In o2hb_region_inc_user(), o2hb_dependent_users is incremented unconditionally before calling o2hb_region_pin(). If the pin fails, the counter is never decremented and any partially-pinned regions are never unpinned, since the caller does not call o2hb_region_dec_user() on error. The leaked counter causes subsequent o2hb_region_inc_user() calls to skip pinning entirely (the > 1 check), leaving heartbeat regions unprotected. Fix by rolling back on failure: call o2hb_region_unpin(NULL) to release any partially-pinned regions and decrement o2hb_dependent_users to restore the pre-increment state. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260722124933.430554-4-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 58a3158 ("ocfs2/cluster: Pin/unpin o2hb regions") Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a63308a upstream. In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is rebuilt with ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset; `ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1) is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of `ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is allowed to exceed 4 GiB. When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely. This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross 4 GiB reaches it. This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb ("exfat: Fix bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND: ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset; 64-bit kernels are unaffected. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260806022044.167962-3-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com Fixes: ccd979b ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: "zhangyi (F)" <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 78004e9 upstream. sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a42 ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0dbc239 upstream. queue_userspace_packet() borrows the packet skb -- it only copies it into a private netlink message (user_skb) and does not own it; on return do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding it through the flow's remaining actions. Its error path nevertheless calls skb_tx_error(skb), which via skb_zcopy_clear() does skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, stripping SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG from that live skb (skb_tx_error()'s kerneldoc says "skb must be freed afterwards"). For a MSG_ZEROCOPY skb carrying page-cache frags, SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is what makes esp_input() skb_cow_data() before in-place AEAD; once it is stripped a later local ESP-in-UDP delivery decrypts in place over pages the sender does not own -- an unprivileged page-cache write (the "Fragnesia" primitive). do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return value, so any action after a failed USERSPACE upcall inherits the stripped skb. Move the skb_tx_error() to the flow-miss drop path - the "default" branch of ovs_dp_process_packet()'s switch(error), before kfree_skb(). The call has been here since commit 36d5fe6 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") but was harmless until esp_input() began relying on SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to gate in-place decrypt; only then did stripping it on a still-forwarded skb become a page-cache write primitive. Fixes: 36d5fe6 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") Fixes: f4c50a4 ("xfrm: esp: avoid in-place decrypt on shared skb frags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org> Tested-by: Jongmin Jang <payload.jang@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/55A52703-7548-4A55-A9CE-2A37145BDCAD@doyensec.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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TPU fixes and PV-IOMMU for Linux.