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Description
This issue holds the acceptance criteria for the restricted tiers listed under "Planned (not yet available)" in docs/tool-profiles.md. None of these tiers may be called a boundary until its criteria hold.
The original "Now" plan (rename sandbox → desktop documented as shell-equivalent, observe profile, browser_evaluate removed from the desktop browser list, tool classification with boundary tests, docs) is done in #46, #48, #49 and #50. The original body is kept at the end. The "Visibility: menu-bar indicator + one-click revoke" item moved to #57. Profile naming is done in #59: observe and owner (see docs/tool-profiles.md).
The browser tier now sits behind the BrowserBackend interface (see #118 and docs/adr/browser-tiers.md): the router picks a backend, and an isolated tier would be one more backend. The managed Playwright backend still uses a persistent profile, so a per-grant throwaway profile is still unmet.
browser tier: isolated browser
A fresh, per-grant throwaway browser profile removes the owner's cookies but not the owner's network position: localhost web terminals (Jupyter, code-server, ttyd, dev servers with eval endpoints), services on the private network that trust a network-level identity header, and file://. Chromium's URLBlocklist has no CIDR support, so it cannot block private ranges on its own.
- The browser's traffic goes through an egress proxy that refuses loopback, link-local, RFC 1918, CGNAT
100.64.0.0/10and overlay-network names, andfile://, or the browser runs in a VM / separate machine with no route to them. - A test navigates to
http://127.0.0.1:<port>, a private-overlay address andfile:///etc/hostsunderbrowserand expects refusal. - Docs say what the tier still reaches (the public internet, as the computer's public IP).
- The tier's
browser_*tools join the same "unclassified fails" test as local tools (localToolClass/LOCAL_TOOL_CLASS), so a new Playwright tool cannot ship unclassified.browser_evaluatestays excluded.
Typed app control (replacing generic osascript for restricted tiers)
Many apps run code: Terminal, iTerm, Script Editor, Finder (.command files), Automator, Shortcuts, IDEs with integrated terminals, anything with a plugin or script host. Xcode matters most: an agent that can push a repository with a Run Script build phase and then trigger Product → Build has code execution as the desktop user. The same holds for any build or test tool pointed at a repository the agent controls (npm scripts, Makefiles, Gradle, swift build plugins).
- The app list is a pure allowlist of bundle IDs. Nothing is allowed by being absent from a deny list.
- Each allowed app / action is classified with the same
observe/act/shellclasses as local tools; "can build or run a project whose contents the agent controls" isshell, so Xcode build/run and any IDE task runner land inshell. - The boundary tests fail if a profile that is not shell-equivalent allows any
shell-class app action.
Custom policies
- No criteria recorded yet. Any custom policy must use the same tool classes and fail the boundary tests if it is not declared shell-equivalent but allows a
shell-class tool.
VM
- Lend a disposable macOS VM (Virtualization.framework / Tart) instead of the host. Criteria to be written when this is picked up.
Applies to every tier: egress
"No egress" in the pod means no overlay-network egress; ordinary internet egress is open by default (the network policy excludes only the overlay ranges, and the ECS tasks have public IPs). A shell-equivalent profile, or an injected observe agent, can exfiltrate to any host. Deployments that need more use a documented egress allowlist (filed on openab-pty).
Original body (2026-09-30)
Summary
The sandbox tool profile is presented as a restricted mode, but it is not a security boundary. GUI control is shell access. An agent that can type, click or run AppleScript can open a terminal, or call do shell script, and so run anything the desktop user can run. Lending a computer under sandbox therefore hands the agent the desktop user's shell for the whole lease (up to 24 h).
External review, 2026-09-30, confirmed against main:
| Claimed | Actual | |
|---|---|---|
macOS ToolProfile.sandbox |
"no exec*, because exec is a full shell as the desktop user" |
only exec* is removed; osascript (do shell script), key (type into Terminal) and mouse remain |
Linux node sandbox |
profile names are shared with macOS | identical to owner, including bash (mcp.rs: "Both profiles get everything") |
sandboxBrowserTools |
README: "not arbitrary code in the browser process" | the list includes browser_evaluate |
| Playwright upstream | — | persistent shared profile (--user-data-dir pw-profile --shared-browser-context): the agent browses with the user's logged-in cookies, and from the host's network (localhost + tailnet) |
A name-filtered tool list inside one desktop session cannot draw a boundary. osascript in particular cannot be made safe by filtering script text: JXA doShellScript, ObjC.import → NSTask, run script, Terminal do script, System Events keystrokes all bypass it.
Plan
Now (this PR):
- Drop
browser_evaluatefromsandboxBrowserTools(Swift + Linux). This is a bug: it contradicts the README. - Rename the profile to
desktop. Keep acceptingsandboxas a wire / persisted alias, so existing Connect / Remote builds and stored grants keep working. The doc comments must say plainly that it is shell-equivalent. - Adversary test: every profile declares whether it is shell-equivalent, and a test fails if a profile that says "no shell" exposes any shell-capable tool (
exec*,osascript,key,mouse,bash). Today this forcesdesktopto be declared shell-equivalent; later it guards any new restricted profile. - README + reverse-attach ADR: replace "the agent already has a shell, so no exec" with the honest statement, and recommend lending a dedicated machine (e.g. a Linux hands node) rather than a primary Mac when full control is granted.
- Linux node: accept
desktop, and stop describingsandboxas narrower.
Next (separate PRs):
-
observeprofile (sys_info+screenshotonly) as a real boundary, and the suggested default in the grant UIs. -
browserprofile: Playwright only, with a per-grant throwaway browser profile, nobrowser_evaluate, and the host-network reach documented. - Replace generic
osascriptfor restricted tiers with typed tools (open app / click menu item / list windows) and a bundle-ID allowlist that excludes Terminal, iTerm, Script Editor and System Settings. - Visibility: menu-bar indicator of the active grant + live tool-call log + one-click revoke. Optional Remote approval for
osascript, or for keys sent while the front app is a terminal. Document these as friction, not a boundary. - Long term: lend a disposable macOS VM (Virtualization.framework / Tart) instead of the host.
Client-side copy: oablab/oab-pty-mac (linked issue).
Original body (before 2026-11-16 cleanup)
This issue holds the acceptance criteria for the restricted tiers listed under "Planned (not yet available)" in docs/tool-profiles.md. None of these tiers may be called a boundary until its criteria hold.
The original "Now" plan (rename sandbox → desktop documented as shell-equivalent, observe profile, browser_evaluate removed from the desktop browser list, tool classification with boundary tests, docs) is done in #46, #48, #49 and #50. The original body is kept at the end. The "Visibility: menu-bar indicator + one-click revoke" item moved to #57. Profile naming will follow #59 (observe / owner).
browser tier: isolated browser
A fresh, per-grant throwaway browser profile removes the owner's cookies but not the owner's network position: localhost web terminals (Jupyter, code-server, ttyd, dev servers with eval endpoints), services on the private network that trust a network-level identity header, and file://. Chromium's URLBlocklist has no CIDR support, so it cannot block private ranges on its own.
- The browser's traffic goes through an egress proxy that refuses loopback, link-local, RFC 1918, CGNAT
100.64.0.0/10and overlay-network names, andfile://, or the browser runs in a VM / separate machine with no route to them. - A test navigates to
http://127.0.0.1:<port>, a private-overlay address andfile:///etc/hostsunderbrowserand expects refusal. - Docs say what the tier still reaches (the public internet, as the computer's public IP).
- The tier's
browser_*tools join the same "unclassified fails" test as local tools (localToolClass/LOCAL_TOOL_CLASS), so a new Playwright tool cannot ship unclassified.browser_evaluatestays excluded.
Typed app control (replacing generic osascript for restricted tiers)
Many apps run code: Terminal, iTerm, Script Editor, Finder (.command files), Automator, Shortcuts, IDEs with integrated terminals, anything with a plugin or script host. Xcode matters most: an agent that can push a repository with a Run Script build phase and then trigger Product → Build has code execution as the desktop user. The same holds for any build or test tool pointed at a repository the agent controls (npm scripts, Makefiles, Gradle, swift build plugins).
- The app list is a pure allowlist of bundle IDs. Nothing is allowed by being absent from a deny list.
- Each allowed app / action is classified with the same
observe/act/shellclasses as local tools; "can build or run a project whose contents the agent controls" isshell, so Xcode build/run and any IDE task runner land inshell. - The boundary tests fail if a profile that is not shell-equivalent allows any
shell-class app action.
Custom policies
- No criteria recorded yet. Any custom policy must use the same tool classes and fail the boundary tests if it is not declared shell-equivalent but allows a
shell-class tool.
VM
- Lend a disposable macOS VM (Virtualization.framework / Tart) instead of the host. Criteria to be written when this is picked up.
Applies to every tier: egress
"No egress" in the pod means no overlay-network egress; ordinary internet egress is open by default (the network policy excludes only the overlay ranges, and the ECS tasks have public IPs). A shell-equivalent profile, or an injected observe agent, can exfiltrate to any host. Deployments that need more use a documented egress allowlist (filed on openab-pty).
Original body (2026-09-30)
Summary
The sandbox tool profile is presented as a restricted mode, but it is not a security boundary. GUI control is shell access. An agent that can type, click or run AppleScript can open a terminal, or call do shell script, and so run anything the desktop user can run. Lending a computer under sandbox therefore hands the agent the desktop user's shell for the whole lease (up to 24 h).
External review, 2026-09-30, confirmed against main:
| Claimed | Actual | |
|---|---|---|
macOS ToolProfile.sandbox |
"no exec*, because exec is a full shell as the desktop user" |
only exec* is removed; osascript (do shell script), key (type into Terminal) and mouse remain |
Linux node sandbox |
profile names are shared with macOS | identical to owner, including bash (mcp.rs: "Both profiles get everything") |
sandboxBrowserTools |
README: "not arbitrary code in the browser process" | the list includes browser_evaluate |
| Playwright upstream | — | persistent shared profile (--user-data-dir pw-profile --shared-browser-context): the agent browses with the user's logged-in cookies, and from the host's network (localhost + tailnet) |
A name-filtered tool list inside one desktop session cannot draw a boundary. osascript in particular cannot be made safe by filtering script text: JXA doShellScript, ObjC.import → NSTask, run script, Terminal do script, System Events keystrokes all bypass it.
Plan
Now (this PR):
- Drop
browser_evaluatefromsandboxBrowserTools(Swift + Linux). This is a bug: it contradicts the README. - Rename the profile to
desktop. Keep acceptingsandboxas a wire / persisted alias, so existing Connect / Remote builds and stored grants keep working. The doc comments must say plainly that it is shell-equivalent. - Adversary test: every profile declares whether it is shell-equivalent, and a test fails if a profile that says "no shell" exposes any shell-capable tool (
exec*,osascript,key,mouse,bash). Today this forcesdesktopto be declared shell-equivalent; later it guards any new restricted profile. - README + reverse-attach ADR: replace "the agent already has a shell, so no exec" with the honest statement, and recommend lending a dedicated machine (e.g. a Linux hands node) rather than a primary Mac when full control is granted.
- Linux node: accept
desktop, and stop describingsandboxas narrower.
Next (separate PRs):
-
observeprofile (sys_info+screenshotonly) as a real boundary, and the suggested default in the grant UIs. -
browserprofile: Playwright only, with a per-grant throwaway browser profile, nobrowser_evaluate, and the host-network reach documented. - Replace generic
osascriptfor restricted tiers with typed tools (open app / click menu item / list windows) and a bundle-ID allowlist that excludes Terminal, iTerm, Script Editor and System Settings. - Visibility: menu-bar indicator of the active grant + live tool-call log + one-click revoke. Optional Remote approval for
osascript, or for keys sent while the front app is a terminal. Document these as friction, not a boundary. - Long term: lend a disposable macOS VM (Virtualization.framework / Tart) instead of the host.
Client-side copy: oablab/oab-pty-mac (linked issue).
Activity
fix(profile): desktop (was sandbox) is shell-equivalent; add observe;…
chaodu-agent commentedon Sep 30, 2026
Follow-up from an external review of
docs/tool-profiles.md(2026-09-30). Point 1 (hand-maintained danger list) and point 4 (observeand prompt injection) are fixed / documented in #48. Points 2 and 3 concern tiers that are still planned here, so recording them as acceptance criteria — neither tier may be called a boundary until these hold.browsertier: a throwaway profile is necessary, not sufficientA fresh profile removes the owner's cookies. It does not remove the owner's network position, and on this computer that can itself be a shell:
browser_navigateto one of them is a shell as the desktop user.tailscale servearrive stamped with the owner'sTailscale-User-Login. A service that authenticates on that header alone treats the agent as the owner. instance-mcp itself is unaffected because it requires identity and a bearer token, but other services on the tailnet may not.file://reads local files, and local HTML can run script.Chromium's managed
URLBlocklistcan blockfile://andlocalhost, but it has no CIDR support, so it cannot block100.64.0.0/10. Acceptance:100.64.0.0/10/ tailnet names (*.ts.net), andfile://— or the browser runs in a VM / separate machine with no route to them.http://127.0.0.1:<port>, a tailnet address andfile:///etc/hostsunderbrowserand expects refusal.Typed app control: a pure allowlist, and build tools count as shell
"The allowlist must exclude Terminal, iTerm, Script Editor and System Settings" reads like a denylist inside an allowlist. Many more apps run code: Finder (opening a
.commandfile), Automator, Shortcuts, VS Code / Cursor (integrated terminal), and anything with a plugin or script host.The one that matters most here is Xcode, because Xcode builds are a primary use of this tool. An agent in the pod can push a repository containing a Run Script build phase; if it can then trigger Product → Build on this Mac, that is arbitrary code execution as the desktop user. The same holds for any build or test tool the agent can point at a repository it controls (npm scripts, Makefiles, Gradle,
swift buildplugins).observe/act/shellclasses as local tools; "can build or run a project whose contents the agent controls" isshell, so Xcode build/run, and any IDE task runner, lands inshell.shell-class app action.fix(profile): classify every tool; boundary tests fail on unclassifie…
chaodu-agent commentedon Sep 30, 2026
Two corrections/additions from a second review pass (docs fixed in the PR above):
networkpolicy-no-tailnet-egress.yamlexcludes only the tailnet ranges, and the ECS tasks setassignPublicIp: true. So a shell-equivalent profile (desktop) or an injectedobserveagent can exfiltrate to any host. The real mitigation for deployments that need it is a documented egress allowlist (model API, git, registries) — filed on openab-pty.localToolClass/LOCAL_TOOL_CLASScovers local tools; upstreambrowser_*are gated by a separate allowlist (correct today: none underobserve). Acceptance for thebrowsertier: its tools must join the same 'unclassified fails' test, so a new Playwright tool cannot ship unclassified.chaodu-agent commentedon Sep 30, 2026
Operational follow-up on the tailnet-egress caveat: our own homelab node p1 was in exactly that shape — host
tailscaledrunning, no NetworkPolicy — and the openab-pty session shells there could reach other tailnet machines as p1 (measured: macmini/black/rpi1 :22 reachable from both pods). Applied openab-pty'snetworkpolicy-no-tailnet-egress.yamlon 2026-09-30; re-measured: tailnet blocked from both pods, internet/DNS unaffected, reverse attach (inbound through the pod sidecar) still attaches, and the p1 host itself keeps its tailnet access.docs: fix Oracle refarch upgrade commands, browser boundary, and prof…
docs: Oracle Cloud reference architecture for instance-mcp (#58)
docs(readme): fix rename banner and repository links (#65)
[-]sandbox profile is not a boundary: GUI control is a shell[/-][+]Planned restricted tiers (isolated browser, typed app control, custom policies, VM): acceptance criteria[/+]chaodu-agent commentedon Nov 7, 2026
Retitled and rescoped: the original "Now" plan is done (#46, #48, #49, #50), and
docs/tool-profiles.mdpoints here for the planned tiers. The body now holds the acceptance criteria from the review comments above; the original body is kept in a collapsed section at the end. The "Visibility: menu-bar indicator + one-click revoke" item moved to #57. Priority stays p3.feat!: collapse tool profiles to observe and owner (#92)
docs: restructure README; move detail to docs/ (#106)